Abstract. We offer a graphical interpretation of unfairness in a dataset as the presence of an unfair causal path in the causal Bayesian network representing the data-generation mechanism. We use this viewpoint to revisit the recent debate surrounding the COMPAS pretrial risk assessment tool and, more generally, to point out that fairness evaluation on a model requires careful considerations on the patterns of unfairness underlying the training data. We show that causal Bayesian networks provide us with a powerful tool to measure unfairness in a dataset and to design fair models in complex unfairness scenarios.
Introduction
Machine learning is increasingly used in a wide range of decision-making scenarios that have serious implications for individuals and society, including financial lending [10, 36] , hiring [8, 28] , online advertising [27, 41] , pretrial and immigration detention [5, 43] , child maltreatment screening [14, 47] , health care [19, 32] , and social services [1, 23] . Whilst this has the potential to overcome undesirable aspects of human decision-making, there is concern that biases in the training data and model inaccuracies can lead to decisions that treat historically discriminated groups unfavourably. The research community has therefore started to investigate how to ensure that learned models do not take decisions that are unfair with respect to sensitive attributes (e.g. race or gender).
This effort has led to the emergence of a rich set of fairness definitions [13, 16, 21, 24, 38] providing researchers and practitioners with criteria to evaluate existing systems or to design new ones. Many such definitions have been found to be mathematically incompatible [7, 13, 15, 16, 30] , and this has been viewed as representing an unavoidable trade-off establishing fundamental limits on fair machine learning, or as an indication that certain definitions do not map on to social or legal understandings of fairness [17] .
Most fairness definitions express properties of the model output with respect to sensitive information, without considering the relations among the relevant variables underlying the data-generation mechanism. As different relations would require a model to satisfy different properties in order to be fair, this could lead
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to erroneously classify as fair/unfair models exhibiting undesirable/legitimate biases.
In this manuscript, we use the causal Bayesian network framework to draw attention to this point, by visually describing unfairness in a dataset as the presence of an unfair causal path in the data-generation mechanism. We then use this viewpoint to raise concern on the fairness debate surrounding the COMPAS pretrial risk assessment tool. Finally, we show that causal Bayesian networks offer a powerful tool for representing, reasoning about, and dealing with complex unfairness scenarios.
A Graphical View of (Un)fairness
Consider a dataset ∆ = {a n , x n , y n } N n=1 , corresponding to N individuals, where a n indicates a sensitive attribute, and x n a set of observations that can be used (possibly together with a n ) to form a predictionŷ n of outcome y n . We assume a binary setting a n , y n ,ŷ n ∈ {0, 1} (unless otherwise specified), and indicate with A, X , Y , andŶ the (set of) random variables 1 corresponding to a n , x n , y n , and y n respectively. In this section we show at a high-level that a correct use of fairness definitions concerned with statistical properties ofŶ with respect to A requires an understanding of the patterns of unfairness underlying ∆, and therefore of the relationships among A, X and Y . More specifically we show that:
(i) Using the framework of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs), unfairness in ∆ can be viewed as the presence of an unfair causal path from A to X or Y .
(ii) In order to determine which propertiesŶ should possess to be fair, it is necessary to question and understand unfairness in ∆. Assume a dataset ∆ = {a
corresponding to a college admission scenario in which applicants are admitted based on qualifications Q, choice of department D, and gender A; and in which female applicants apply more often to certain departments. This scenario can be represented by the CBN on the left (see Appendix A for an overview of BNs, and Sect. 3 for a detailed treatment of CBNs). The causal path A → Y represents direct influence of gender A on admission Y , capturing the fact that two individuals with the same qualifications and applying to the same department can be treated differently depending on their gender. The indirect causal path A → D → Y represents influence of A on Y through D, capturing the fact that female applicants more often apply to certain departments. Whilst the direct path A → Y is certainly an unfair one, the paths A → D and D → Y , and therefore A → D → Y , could either be considered as fair or as unfair. For example, rejecting women more often due to department choice could be considered fair with respect to college responsibility. However, this could be considered unfair with respect to societal responsibility if the departmental differences were a result of systemic historical or cultural factors (e.g. if female applicants apply to specific departments at lower rates because of overt or covert societal discouragement). Finally, if the college were to lower the admission rates for departments chosen more often by women, then the path D → Y would be unfair.
Deciding whether a path is fair or unfair 2 requires careful ethical and sociological considerations and/or might not be possible from a dataset alone. Nevertheless, this example illustrates that we can view unfairness in a dataset as the presence of an unfair causal path from the sensitive attribute A to X or Y . Different (un)fair path labeling requiresŶ to have different characteristics in order to be fair. In the case in which the causal paths from A to Y are all unfair (e.g. if A → D → Y is considered unfair), aŶ that is statistically independent of A (denoted withŶ ⊥ ⊥ A) would not contain any of the unfair influence of A on Y . In such a case,Ŷ is said to satisfy demographic parity.
Demographic Parity (DP).Ŷ satisfies demographic parity ifŶ ⊥ ⊥ A, i.e. p(Ŷ = 1|A = 0) = p(Ŷ = 1|A = 1), where e.g. p(Ŷ = 1|A = 0) can be estimated as
with 1ŷn =1,a n =0 = 1 ifŷ n = 1 and a n = 0 (and zero otherwise), and where N 0 indicates the number of individuals with a n = 0. Notice that many classifiers, rather than a binary predictionŷ n ∈ {0, 1}, output a degree of belief that the individual belongs to class 1, r n , also called score. For example, in the case of logistic regression r n corresponds to the probability of class 1, i.e. r n = p(Y = 1|a
n , x n ). To obtain the predictionŷ n ∈ {0, 1} from r n , it is common to use a threshold θ, i.e.ŷ n = 1 r n >θ . In this case, we can rewrite the estimate for p(Ŷ = 1|A = 0) as
1 r n >θ,a n =0 .
Notice that R ⊥ ⊥ A impliesŶ ⊥ ⊥ A for all values of θ.
In the case in which the causal paths from A to Y are all fair (e.g. if A → Y is absent and A → D → Y is considered fair), aŶ such thatŶ ⊥ ⊥ A|Y or Y ⊥ ⊥ A|Ŷ would be allowed to contain such a fair influence, but the (dis)agreement between Y andŶ would not be allowed to depend on A. In these cases,Ŷ is said to satisfy equal false positive/false negative rates and calibration respectively. In the case in which at least one causal path from A to Y is unfair (e.g. if A → Y is present), EFPRs/EFNRs and calibration are inappropriate criteria, as they would not require the unfair influence of A on Y to be absent fromŶ (e.g. a perfect model (Ŷ = Y ) would automatically satisfy EFPRs/EFNRs and calibration, but would contain the unfair influence). This observation is particularly relevant to the recent debate surrounding the correctional offender management profiling for alternative sanctions (COMPAS) pretrial risk assessment tool. We revisit this debate in the next section.
The COMPAS Debate
Over the past few years, numerous state and local governments around the United States have sought to reform their pretrial court systems with the aim of reducing unprecedented levels of incarceration, and specifically the population of low-income defendants and racial minorities in America's prisons and jails [2, 25, 31] . As part of this effort, quantitative tools for determining a person's likelihood for reoffending or failure to appear, called risk assessment instruments (RAIs), were introduced to replace previous systems driven largely by opaque discretionary decisions and money bail [6, 26] . However, the expansion of pretrial RAIs has unearthed new concerns of racial discrimination which would nullify the purported benefits of these systems and adversely impact defendants' civil liberties.
An intense ongoing debate, in which the research community has also been heavily involved, was triggered by an exposé from investigative journalists at ProPublica [5] on the COMPAS pretrial RAI developed by Equivant (formerly Northpointe) and deployed in Broward County in Florida. The COMPAS general recidivism risk scale (GRRS) and violent recidivism risk scale (VRRS), the focus of ProPublica's investigation, sought to leverage machine learning techniques to improve the predictive accuracy of recidivism compared to older RAIs such as the level of service inventory-revised [3] which were primarily based on theories and techniques from a sub-field of psychology known as the psychology of criminal conduct [4, 9] 3 . Fig. 1 . Number of black and white defendants in each of two aggregate risk categories [15] . The overall recidivism rate for black defendants is higher than for white defendants ProPublica's criticism of COMPAS centered on two concerns. First, the authors argued that the distribution of the risk score R ∈ {1, . . . , 10} exhibited discriminatory patterns, as black defendants displayed a fairly uniform distribution across each value, while white defendants exhibited a right skewed distribution, suggesting that the COMPAS recidivism risk scores disproportionately rated white defendants as lower risk than black defendants. Second, the authors claimed that the GRRS and VRRS did not satisfy EFPRs and EFNRs, as FPRs = 44.9% and FNRs = 28.0% for black defendants, whilst FPRs = 23.5% and FNRs = 47.7% for white defendants (see Fig. 1 ). This evidence led ProPublica to conclude that COMPAS had a disparate impact on black defendants, leading to public outcry over potential biases in RAIs and machine learning writ large.
In response, Equivant published a technical report [20] refuting the claims of bias made by ProPublica and concluded that COMPAS is sufficiently calibrated, in the sense that it satisfies predictive parity at key thresholds. Subsequent analyses [13, 16, 30 ] confirmed Equivant's claims of calibration, but also demonstrated the incompatibility of EFPRs/EFNRs and calibration due to differences in base transformed into decile values by ranking and calibration with a normative group to ensure an equal proportion of scores within each scale value. Lastly, to aid practitioner interpretation, the scores are grouped into three risk categories. The scale values are displayed to court officials as either Low (1-4), Medium (5-7), and High (8-10) risk.
rates across groups (Y & & ⊥ ⊥A) (see Appendix B). Moreover, the studies suggested that attempting to satisfy these competing forms of fairness force unavoidable trade-offs between criminal justice reformers' purported goals of racial equity and public safety.
As explained in Sect. 2, by requiring the rate of (dis)agreement between Y andŶ to be the same for black and white defendants (and therefore by not being concerned with dependence of Y on A), EFPRs/EFNRs and calibration are inappropriate fairness criteria if dependence of Y on A includes influence of A on Y through an unfair causal path. As previous research has shown [29, 35, 44] , modern policing tactics center around targeting a small number of neighborhoods -often disproportionately populated by non-white and low income residents -with recurring patrols and stops. This uneven distribution of police attention, as well as other factors such as funding for pretrial services [31, 46] , means that differences in base rates between racial groups are not reflective of ground truth rates. We can rephrase these findings as indicating the presence of a direct path A → Y (through unobserved neighborhood) in the CBN representing the data-generation mechanism (Fig. 2) . Such tactics also imply an influence of A on Y through the set of variables F containing number of prior arrests. In addition, the influence of A on Y through A → Y and A → F → Y could be more prominent or contain more unfairness due to racial discrimination.
These observations indicate that EFPRs/EFNRs and calibration are inappropriate criteria for this case (and therefore that their incompatibility is irrelevant), and more generally that the current fairness debate surrounding COMPAS gives insufficient consideration to the patterns of unfairness underlying the training data. Our analysis formalizes the concerns raised by social scientists and legal scholars on mismeasurement and unrepresentative data in the US criminal justice system. Multiple studies [22, 34, 37, 46] have argued that the core premise of RAIs, to assess the likelihood a defendant reoffends, is impossible to measure and that the empirical proxy used (e.g. arrest or conviction) introduces embedded biases and norms which render existing fairness tests unreliable.
This section used the CBN framework to describe at a high-level different patterns of unfairness that can underlie a dataset and to point out issues with current deployment of fairness definitions. In the remainder of the manuscript, we use this framework more extensively to further advance our analysis on fairness. Before doing that, we give some background on CBNs [18, 39, 40, 42, 45] , assuming that all variables except A are continuous.
Causal Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph where nodes and edges represent random variables and statistical dependencies. Each node X i in the graph is associated with the conditional distribution p(X i |pa(X i )), where pa(X i ) is the set of parents of X i . The joint distribution of all nodes, p(X 1 , . . . , X I ), is given by the product of all conditional distributions, i.e. p(X 1 , . . . , X I ) = I i=1 p(X i |pa(X i )) (see Appendix A for more details on Bayesian networks).
When equipped with causal semantic, namely when representing the datageneration mechanism, Bayesian networks can be used to visually express causal relationships. More specifically, CBNs enable us to give a graphical definition of causes and causal effects: if there exists a directed path from A to Y , then A is a potential cause of Y . Directed paths are also called causal paths. Fig. 3(a) : the variable C is said to be a confounder for the effect of A on Y , as it confounds the causal effect with non-causal information. To understand this, assume that A represents hours of exercise in a week, Y cardiac health, and C age: observing cardiac health conditioning on exercise level from p(Y |A) does not enable us to understand the effect of exercise on cardiac health, since p(Y |A) includes the dependence between A and Y induced by age.
Each parent-child relationship in a CBN represents an autonomous mechanism, and therefore it is conceivable to change one such a relationship without changing the others. This enables us to express the causal effect of A = a on Y as the conditional distribution p →A=a (Y |A = a) on the modified CBN G →A=a of Fig. 3(b) , resulting from replacing p(A|C) with a Dirac delta distribution δ A=a (thereby removing the link from C to A) and leaving the remaining conditional distributions p(Y |A, C) and p(C) unaltered -this process is called intervention
. This is a special case of the following back-door adjustment formula. Fig. 4(a) , conditioning on C closes the paths
Conditioning on
The back-door criterion can also be derived from the rules of do-calculus [39, 40] , which indicate whether and how p →A (Y |A) can be estimated using observations from G: for many graph structures with unobserved confounders the only way to compute causal effects is by collecting observations directly from G →A -in this case the effect is said to be non-identifiable. 
i.e. we retrieve the back-door adjustment formula.
In the remainder of the section we show that, by performing different interventions on A along different causal paths, it is possible to isolate the contribution of the causal effect of A on Y along a group of paths.
Direct and Indirect Effect
Consider the CBN of Fig. 4(b The difference ADEā a − AIE aā gives the average total effect (ATE) ATEā a = Y a p(Ya) − Yā p(Yā)
5 . To estimate the effect along a specific group of causal paths, we can generalize the formulas for the ADE and AIE by replacing the variable in the first term with the one resulting from performing the intervention A = a along the group of interest and A =ā along the remaining causal paths. For example, consider the CBN of 
Path-Specific Effect
In the simple case in which the CBN corresponds to a linear model, e.g.
5 Often the AIE of A = a with respect to A =ā is defined as AIE ā aa = Ya p(Ya) − Ya(Mā) p(Ya(Mā)) = −AIEaā, which differs in setting A to a rather than toā along A → Y . In the linear case, the two definitions coincide (see Eqs. (2) and (3)). Similarly the ADE can be defined as ADE Notice that AIEā a , given by
coincides with AIE 
Fairness Considerations using CBNs
Equipped with the background on CBNs from Sect. 3, in this section we further investigate unfairness in a dataset ∆ = {a n , x n , y n } N n=1 , discuss issues that might arise when building a decision system from it, and show how to measure and deal with unfairness in complex scenarios, revisiting and extending material from [11, 33, 48] .
Back-door Paths from A to Y
In Sect. 2 we have introduced a graphical interpretation of unfairness in a dataset ∆ as the presence of an unfair causal path from A to X or Y . More specifically, we have shown through a college admission example that unfairness can be due to an unfair link emerging (a) from A or (b) from a subsequent variable in a causal path from A to Y (e.g. D → Y in the example). Our discussion did not mention paths from A to Y with an arrow pointing into A, namely back-door paths. This is because such paths are not problematic. 
Opening Closed Unfair Paths from A to Y
In Sect. 2, we have seen that, in order to reason about fairness ofŶ , it is necessary to question and understand unfairness in ∆. In this section, we warn that another crucial element needs to be considered in the fairness discussion aroundŶ , namely (i) The variables used to formŶ could project intoŶ unfair patterns in X that do not concern Y . This could happen, for example, if a closed unfair path from A to Y is opened when conditioning on the variables used to formŶ .
A M X Y α β γ Fig. 6 . CBN underlying a music degree scenario.
As an example, assume the CBN in Fig. 6 representing the data-generation mechanism underlying a music degree scenario, where A corresponds to gender, M to music aptitude (unobserved, i.e. M / ∈ ∆), X to the score obtained from an ability test taken at the beginning of the degree, and Y to the score obtained from an ability test taken at the end of the degree. Individuals with higher music aptitude M are more likely to obtain higher initial and final scores (M → X, M → Y ). Due to discrimination occurring at the initial testing, women are assigned a lower initial score than men for the same aptitude level (A → X). 
Therefore, this predictor would be using the sensitive attribute to form a decision, although implicitly rather than explicitly. Instead, a predictor explicitly using the sensitive attribute,Ŷ = θ X X + θ A A, would have parameters
i.e.Ŷ = γM . Therefore, this predictor would be fair. From the CBN we can see that the explicit use of A can be of help in retrieving M . Indeed, since M& & ⊥ ⊥A|X, using A in addition to X can give information about M . In general (e.g. in a non-linear setting) it is not guaranteed that using A would ensureŶ ⊥ ⊥ A. Nevertheless, this example shows how explicit use of the sensitive attribute in a model can ensure fairness rather than leading to unfairness. This observation is relevant to one of the simplest fairness definitions, motivated by legal requirements, called fairness through unawareness, which states thatŶ is fair as long as it does not make explicit use of the sensitive attribute A. Whilst this fairness criterion is often indicated as problematic because some of the variables used to formŶ could be a proxy for A (such as neighborhood for race), the example above shows a more subtle issue with it.
Path-Specific Population-level Unfairness
In this section, we show that the path-specific effect introduced in Sect. 3 can be used to quantify unfairness in ∆ in complex scenarios.
Consider the college admission example discussed in Sect. 2 (Fig. 7 ). In the more complex case in which the path A → D → Y is considered fair, unfairness can instead be quantified with the path-specific effect along the direct path A → Y , PSEā a , given by
Notice that computing p(Y a (Dā)) requires knowledge of the CBN. If the CBN structure is not known or estimating its conditional distributions is challenging, the resulting estimate could be imprecise.
Path-Specific Individual-level Unfairness
In the college admission example of Fig. 7 in which the path A → D → Y is considered fair, rather than measuring unfairness overall population, we might want to know e.g. whether a rejected female applicant {a n = a, q n , d n , y n = 0} was treated unfairly. We can answer this question by estimating whether the applicant would have been admitted had she been male (A =ā) along the direct
To understand how this can be achieved, consider the following linear model associated to a CBN with the same structure as the one in Fig. 7 A ∼ Bern(π),
where q , d and y are unobserved independent zero-mean Gaussian variables. 
The two groups of variables are connected through d , q , y , indicating that the factual and counterfactual worlds share the same unobserved randomness. From this network, we can deduce
, and therefore that we can express
As p( 
Therefore, as Q is not a descendant of A and D is a descendant of A along a fair path, the outcome in the counterfactual world is obtained by correcting the outcome in the factual world through replacing θ y a a with θ y aā . Suppose that we want to post-process a learned model (4) to give a prediction
the resulting model is said to satisfy path-specific counterfactual fairness [11] . By performing a similar reasoning to the one above for
i.e. the counterfactual prediction can be estimated by conditioning Y on q n and d n , and by replacing a withā in the direct path A → Y . In the case in which A → D is also unfair, we have
i.e. the counterfactual prediction can be estimated by conditioning Y on q n and the corrected version of ) can be interpreted as a corrected version of d n . From the discussion above we can deduce that the general procedure for computing the desired counterfactual outcome is to condition Y on the nondescendants of A, on the descendants of A that are only fairly influenced by A, and on corrected versions of the descendants that are (partially) unfairly influenced by A.
Conclusions
We used causal Bayesian networks to provide a graphical interpretation of unfairness in a dataset as the presence of an unfair causal path. We used this viewpoint to revisit the recent debate surrounding the COMPAS pretrial risk assessment tool and, more generally, to point out that fairness evaluation on a model requires careful considerations on the patterns of unfairness underlying the training data. We then showed that causal Bayesian networks provide us with a powerful tool to measure unfairness in a dataset and to design fair models in complex unfairness scenarios.
Our discussion did not cover difficulties in making reasonable assumptions on the structure of the causal Bayesian network underlying a dataset, nor on the estimations of the associated conditional distributions or of other quantities of interest. These are obstacles that need to be carefully considered to avoid improper usage of this framework. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a directed graph with no directed paths starting and ending at the same node. For example, the directed graph in Fig.  8(a) is acyclic. The addition of a link from X 4 to X 1 makes the graph cyclic ( Fig. 8(b) ). A node X i with a directed link to X j is called parent of X j . In this case, X j is called child of X i .
A node is a collider on a path if it has (at least) two parents on that path. Notice that a node can be a collider on a path and a non-collider on another path. For example, in Fig. 8 (a) X 3 is a collider on the path X 1 → X 3 ← X 2 and a non-collider on the path X 2 → X 3 → X 4 .
A node X i is an ancestor of a node X j if there exists a directed path from X i to X j . In this case, X j is a descendant of X i .
A Bayesian network is a DAG in which nodes represent random variables and links express statistical relationships between the variables. Each node X i in the graph is associated with the conditional distribution p(X i |pa(X i )), where pa(X i ) is the set of parents of X i . The joint distribution of all nodes, p(X 1 , . . . , X I ), is given by the product of all conditional distributions, i.e. p(X 1 , . . . , X I ) = I i=1 p(X i |pa(X i )).
In a Bayesian network, the sets of variables X and Y are statistically independent given Z (X ⊥ ⊥ Y | Z) if all paths from any element of X to any element of Y are closed (or blocked ). A path is closed if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) There is a non-collider on the path which belongs to the conditioning set Z. (b) There is a collider on the path such that neither the collider nor any of its descendants belong to the conditioning set Z.
